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A recent article in the journal of Legal Education by Joan Howland and 
Nancy Lewis1 reports on a survey of law firm librarians assessing the legal 
research skills of summer clerks and first-year associates. The article 
concludes that law students are poorly trained to do legal research. The 
authors describe this situation as a problem, one that law school adminis-
trators ought to examine and solve. I have no reason to disagree with the 
survey results, but I think a few comments about the nature of the problem 
are in order. I write as a tenure-track faculty member who once taught legal 
research and who retains a keen interest in the subject. 
I will make three observations. First, law school administrators may not 
have improved the legal research curriculum over the years because it is 
adequate already. In a sense, surveys such as Howland and Lewis's tend to 
confirm that conclusion. Second, the reward structure for law school faculty 
favors publishing, not teaching; those interested in greater emphasis on 
instruction in research cannot easily overcome this fact of academic life. 
Third, law school administrators will not improve the legal research 
curriculum until they feel some pressure to do so. The pressure of 
librarians' complaining has obviously not been enough. The demand for 
better research instruction must come from law firms and from the addition 
of a legal research component to state bar examinations. 
Why the Research Curriculum May Be Adequate Already 
To borrow a phrase from Holmes, a problem is not a "brooding 
omnipresence in the sky."2 It is something experienced by an identifiable 
person or group. If people do not experience a problem, then they do not 
have a problem-no matter how many times somebody tells them they do. 
I conclude that administrators and faculty not involved with teaching 
research in law schools (the "decision makers"3) do not have a problem; if 
I. Trotter Hardy is Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of 
William & Mary. 
l. Joan S. Howland & Nancy J. Lewis, The Effectiveness of Law School Research Training 
Programs, 40 J. Legal Educ. 381 (1990). 
2. Holmes, J., dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916). 
3. I recognize that many librarians are faculty members and therefore participate in 
decisions about curricula. They are usually in a small minority, however, so when I say 
"decision makers" I am referring to those who have the .power-m~ority votes, 
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they did, they would be hard at work trying to solve it. Instead, the people 
who have a problem are the people who teach legal research in law schools 
and law firms, often librarians and adjunct or non-tenure-track faculty 
("research teachers"). Those who teach research are engaged in the fruitless 
task of trying to persuade decision makers that the decision makers have a 
problem they do not experience. 
How can it be that those who teach research perceive a problem, when 
those empowered to commit resources to teaching do not? One surprising 
answer is that legal research may not be all that important. In a back-
handed way, the survey by Howland and Lewis implies that that is so. The 
survey sampled law firms that are "large enough to employ professional 
librarians"-firms located in large metropolitan areas that employ, on 
average, 154 lawyers. For the needs of their practices, the firm librarians 
reported a dismal level of research competence among summer clerks and 
first-year associates. 
Most lawyers do not, however, work in big-city firms that employ over 
150 lawyers. In fact, over ninety percent of all American law firms consist 
of one or two lawyers. Firms of more than fifty lawyers account for only 
eleven percent of all practicing lawyers. Roughly forty-five percent of all 
lawyers are in general practice, not the specialty practices that are a feature 
of most large firms.4 Although general practice lawyers handle a wide array 
of cases, from corporate work to personal injury to divorce, one might guess 
that they do not need to do anything approaching the amount of research 
done in large firms. 
If this guess is true, then law schools may already be doing a cost-
effective job for most of their graduates, in the sense that most of those 
graduates do not need any better instruction than they are getting. To be 
sure, this in itself may be a sad commentary on the overall competence of 
the bar. Perhaps even small-firm lawyers could do a better job if they had 
better research skills. But if that were true, why would lawyers with better 
research skills not drive lawyers with only minimal skills out of business? 
That this has not happened among smaller firms suggests strongly that 
these firms are already doing a cost-effective job of research and that 
lawyers who go to work in these firms do not need additional legal research 
instruction in law school. 
It may well be that the most cost-effective system of legal research 
instruction overall is one in which law schools teach an absolute minimum 
of research skills, with individual firms then investing whatever resources 
they think are necessary to raise their new associates' skills to the appro-
priate level. Formalized law firm instruction in research skills would, in this 
view, be an appropriate and economically efficient way to train lawyers-
not at all the desperate response to a chronic law school failure that many 
librarians believe it to be. 
authority, or whatever-actually to effect a change in how research is taught. I take it as 
a given that librarians and other teachers of research do not have that power; othcnvisc 
things would have changed long ago. 
4. All figures come from Robert MacCrate, The Hidden Majority, A.B.A. J ., April!, 1988, 
at 8. 
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A second reason that research may not be emphasized more in law 
school curricula is that the incentive structure facing faculty members 
discourages attention to teaching research. Law school faculty not now 
involved with the research curriculum are rewarded for what they already 
do; they will not be rewarded for doing a better job of teaching legal 
research. Let me break this observation down into three points. 
First, faculty members at the kind of schools sending graduates to the 
kind of firm that Howland and Lewis surveyed receive external rewards 
such as prestige, salary, tenure, and promotions primarily for their schol-
arship and publications. They receive external rewards secondarily if at all 
from teaching.s They may receive the internal rewards of satisfaction-the 
sense of a ')ob well done"-from both activities. However, because the 
sense of satisfaction is much the same whether one teaches research or 2. 
substantive course, differences in the energy and attention faculty pay to 
scholarship versus teaching will be governed largely by the external 
rewards, and those rewards ovenvhelmingly favor scholarship. 
Second, legal research is a skill, and like the other skills components of 
law school curricula, including trial advocacy, negotiations, and brief 
writing, it requires considerable resources to be taught well. Skills training 
requires on-going development of detailed problems, a high faculty-
student ratio, and substantial clerical and administrative support, as well as 
funding for new staff or the time and attention of existing faculty-all of 
which translates into a very resource-intensive curriculum. Increased 
resources are not on the horizon for most law schools, however, and will not 
appear simply in response to the urging of those who want to improve the 
research curriculum. 
Third, the existing reward structure guarantees that most faculty already 
spend as little time on teaching as they can justify, consistent with their 
personal desires and professional obligations. Asking these faculty to 
improve the research curriculum is therefore asking them to take money, 
time, and energy away from the activity that brings them their greatest ' 
external reward-scholarship-and to apply those resources to teaching 
research skills-an activity that brings them essentially no external reward 
whatever. It is not going to happen. 
I point out these factors not because I oppose improvements in the legal 
research programs at law schools, but rather because I think it important 
5. Students continually express dismay over the faculty reward structure, as if it were 
established by conscious human control and could be changed by some sort of faculty 
vote or administrative action. It is not and cannot be, of course. Scholarship gets 
rewarded largely because everyone who matters (faculty at other schools) can and will 
learn what particular faculty members think by reading their publications-which go to 
most academic law libraries and are easily available. Almost no one knows what or how 
other faculty members teach. The reward structure will therefore shift to teaching only 
when classroom sessions are filmed and readily available in libraries everywhere. I hope 
I am not unduly negative in thinking that this has less tlian a snowball's chance in hell 
of happening. 
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for those involved with research to have a realistic understanding of some 
of the reasons that research programs are not better than they are. 
How to Improve the Research Curriculum 
So much for the bad news-now let me make some suggestions. If 
research teachers believe that a greater academic emphasis should be 
placed on research, then some way has to be found to make that need a 
problem of the law school's decision makers, not just the research teachers. 
The decision makers must feel the pain of inadequate research programs. 
Until they feel it directly, they will not have a problem and accordingly will 
have no motivation to come up with a solution. Although dissatisfied firms 
occasionally call law school librarians and placement directors about the 
inadequate research skills of recently hired clerks and associates, 6 they 
should instead call the law school dean or chair of the curriculum 
committee. Librarians receiving such calls should suggest that the caller 
speak directly to those responsible for decisions about the research curric-
ulum and offer to transfer the call. A lawyer's complaining directly to the 
dean or curriculum committee chair will have far more impact than the 
librarian's relaying the message. 
Law firm librarians who know first-hand how poorly trained their new 
associates are should keep a record of how much of the firm's resources go 
to correcting research deficiencies. How many hours are spent answering 
questions that should have been unnecessary? How many training sessions 
must the firm conduct each year? How much time goes into preparing for 
these sessions? How many Lexis or Westlaw hours are unnecessarily 
consumed by ignorant searches that inflate the firm's fees, which then 
encourages corporate clients to do more work in-house? If these figures 
add up to significant costs, then firms will begin to press the law schools for 
better research teaching. 
A longer-range plan that librarians and firms and faculty ought to 
support would be to add a legal research component to state bar examina-
tions. One may wonder why it is not already there. Nearly everyone gives 
lip service to the need for research skills, so there cannot be any objection 
in principle to testing research as a condition for admission to the bar. The 
objections will all be practical: research cannot effectively be tested; it varies 
too much from state to state and among different areas of practice; because 
questions would require references to private publishers, the test would 
unfairly boost or disparage certain publishers; testing research skills would 
add to the complexity and cost of an already burdensome exam; research is 
a nuts-and-bolts matter and the exams are designed to test thinking; and so 
forth. 
Some of these objections are patently groundless. Research can be tested 
as well as anything can be, and it is tested in many law schools. Research 
6. See Alan Holoch, Legal Research: "From the Blackboard to the Jungle," Legal 
Publishing Preview [R. R. Bowker], Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 117. I am told by some librarians 
that such calls are rare; if that is true, it constitutes further evidence that the research 
problem is a problem of those who teach research, not a problem of law firms. 
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does not vary across state lines as much as law does. Research teachers refer 
to, discuss, and teach about private publishers in law schools and law firms 
every day of the week. Other objections prove to be groundless as well. The 
complexity and cost of bar exams are secondary to the issue of exam 
relevance and validity. If research skills are necessary to the proper practice 
of law but cannot be added to existing bar exams, then something is wrong 
with existing bar exams, and it is time to overhaul them. Anyone who thinks 
that bar exams only test high-level thinking skills must not know what 
"thinking" is. Every bar requires an immense amount of memorization, 
often about such procedural nuts-and-bolts issues as when and where to file 
lawsuits. To the extent that research involves matters of detail, it differs not 
one whit from existing detailed bar questions. More to the point, research 
is a skill that often requires highly abstract thinking about how to solve 
problems; in this respect, research differs not one whit from the "best" 
questions on bar exams. After all, if research were so trivial a matter that it 
needed no testing, why are so many lawyers so poor at it? 
Objections to a research component on bar exams will ultimately spring 
from bar examiners' unwillingness to change the system. Few of us, after 
all, seek to make more work for ourselves if we do not gain from the effort. 
How can research teachers overcome this unwillingness? One way is to ease 
the burden of preparing questions. A task force of law school and law firm 
librarians should formulate a set of bar exam questions, which can then be 
tested and improved. Under the auspices of the AALL and the AALS, a 
continuing committee should review and update the questions each year 
for the bar examiners. Research teachers can grade the questions. If adding 
a research component to bar exams is relatively painless for examiners and 
has the advantage of putting renewed emphasis on a neglected but 
significant area of law school curricula, it stands a chance of happening. 
Conclusion 
"Research researchers" such as Howland and Lewis might consider a 
new question on their next survey: Would law firm librarians support the 
inclusion of a legal research component on state bar examinations? If the 
response is strongly positive, the chances of success are immeasurably 
better. 
The teaching of legal research can be improved, but only if those in a 
position to do something about it are given an incentive. That means that 
law school deans and committee chairs, as well as bar examiners, have to 
feel some direct discomfort from inadequate research instruction. If they 
do not, research teachers can complain all they like, but nothing will 
happen; if they do, change and improvement in the research curriculum 
will follow naturally. 
